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Remarks of 
SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D-MONT.) 
Before the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations 
January 21, 1976 
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: These hearings 
coincide with the concluding days of the Select Committee's inves-
tigation into illegal, improper or unethical activities conducted 
by the Nation's intelligence community. 
As we learn about and begin to understand these revela-
tions it becomes apparent that what the American people knew 
before were but dim shadows of our intelligence establishment --
shadows which were cast only from time to time. For most of us 
the community itself remains as it had before -- cloaked in mystery. 
Heretofore, that was so because Congress largely chose to ignore 
it. It will continue a mystery, however, unless and until Congress 
chooses to change its policy and to exert some degree of scrutiny 
and vigilence, to perform some measure of oversight, to extract a 
commitment of on going accountability. The excesses of our 
intelligence community now so familiar to us all are a direct result 
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of Congressional neglect and inattention. 
What is to be remembered in the context of these hearings 
and any forthcoming recommendations is the essential necessity 
for a strong, vital and highly competent intelligence gathering 
facility within the Nation. What is not to be forgotten for a 
moment is the outstanding work to date performed by the CIA, the 
NSA, the FBI and all of the rest. That is not to say that there 
is no compelling need for vigilence and accountability. Super-
vision and responsiveness are the only ways we might avoid as 
much as possible the recurrence of past strains against our 
constitutional system. 
The initial question then is whether there is to be any 
oversight facility concerning the intelligence community within 
the Senate. That question for me personally does not need 
extensive comment. Even without recent investigations it was 
clear that Congressional awareness of intelligence activities had 
been inadequa te. Either unable, unwilling, ill-e quipped or othe r-
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wise, the Senate certainly has not performed this essential 
function. It could be said that we as elected representatives 
under this form of government simply have not performed as we 
should have performed. We have been inexcusably lax. Now is 
not the time, nor is this the place to assess blame, ~~-~~~~~~' to 
cite responsibility or to lay bare these deficiencies of the past. 
Nor indeed was it the Senate alone that failed. But the failure 
is there nonetheless, cumulatively but unmistakedly. It is there 
in terms of the abuse, in terms of the waste and inefficiency, 
in terms of outright assaults against freedom and individual 
liberty. 
Intelligence is necessary. It is necessary, essential, 
right and appropriate. But neither is that an issue before this 
Committee. In the past in America the intelligence function has 
been a cornerstone to national survival, manned, 1n my judgment, 
by the most competent, effective and dedicated individuals ever 
assembled. In the context of the world as it is and as it will no 
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doubt continue, intelligence gathering will remain a vital support 
to the Nation. No one seriously questions that proposition. What 
you are here considering, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, 
is oversight, or awareness, or watchfulness, all reflecting the 
appropriate role of the legislative body within the framework of 
American democracy. To be sure, there will be cries of meddling, 
of wrongful intrusion, of so-called "politics." Already they are 
heard - in the corridors outside and even in the press. But be 
steadfast, I suggest, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee. 
Be steadfast in your efforts to recommend to the Senate a facility 
that will provide regular, comprehensive and systematic oversight 
regarding the Nation's intelligence function. Those cries were 
heard before and they prevailed. They served to obstruct the role 
of this institution only to misdirect it or mislead it at times 
in pursuit of ill-advised and misguided policies both at home and 
abroad. 
As you know, my own efforts to create a more consistent 
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and comprehensive approach to intelligence oversight by the 
Senate goes back more than a decade. The reasons for my past 
concern, may I say, have been amply justified recently in terms 
of the task undertaken this past year by the Church-Tower Committee. 
Those reasons are diverse -- as diverse as intelligence operations 
themselves; operations which are scattered among and between a 
dozen or more agencies, bureaus and departments. CIA, as this 
Committee knows, undertakes only a fragment of the total intelli-
gence activities of the United States Government. There is NSA, 
DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence within the State Department, 
Treasury's Office of National Security, ERDA, the Air Force 
t~ 
intelligence unit, G-2 in the Army/ ~ Marine Corps, Naval intelli-
gence and then the dozen or so agencies that cover domestic 
intelligence including FBI, DEA, IRS and so forth. Within this 
intelligence thicket have arisen unneeded overlaps and duplica-
tion of effort, goals and achievements. To reshuffle and 
restructure them will take more than the immediate task this 
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Committee assumes. They do explain a small aspect of the problem, 
however. The history of effective coordination is as uneven as 
the history of the growth of the intelligence community itself 
and the changing cast of officials within the differing lines of 
authority charged with administering it. 
Then too, there is the question of federal agencies 
directing actions against individual u. s. citizens in clear 
violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution. 
This is only another aspect of the problem. But it should also 
be open to some form of Senate scrutiny. 
And in connection with overlap and duplication, what 
about the effective use of intelligence reports? Within the 
various components of the intelligence community there often have 
existed differing conclusions about a given set of facts or events. 
In helping to formulate national policy should we in the Senate 
not have the benefit of the various reactions within the intelli-
gence community to a problem facing the Nation? Admittedly, global 
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conflict at times seems to pounce on us as a Nation but the 
lesson of Vietnam stands also as a reminder of an information 
and assessment hiatus that in my judgment assisted the misdirec-
tion, misapplication and imprudent commitment of U. S. resources 
and manpower. By the same token, let us remember that Angola 
stands immediately before us with the Middle East as always on 
the horizon. 
Delicate indeed does this become when we speak of covert 
actions employed to influence events. It is not that they should 
be abandoned. It is rather that their purposes be measured with 
more care than previously demanded against the vital interests of 
the United States. It means too that effective awareness of them be 
extended to this institution. 
Beyond these issues there is the question of fitting 
together the Nation's intelligence components from the standpoint 
of external threats vis-a-vis actions occurring within our 
national boundaries which tend to serve them or to aid or assist 
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them. Such an oversight mandate must, therefore, include the 
capacity to accommodate an integrated perception of national 
intelligence - not foreign intelligence, not domestic intelligence --
but national intelligence. 
Certainly, there are additional issues that would justify 
an intelligence oversight function or mandate by the Senate. But, 
as I perceive the task of your Committee, Mr. Chairman, with the 
rationale already there, the endeavor now is to design a Senate 
facility capable of doing the job while at the same time safe-
guarding the most vital secrets of the Nation -- and by that I 
mean matters the exposure of which would threaten our very survival. 
How do I see such a facility? Its shape? Its function? 
Its form? In part I have explained it already, but I would like 
to make some further comments. 
First of all, should it be a Senate facility? Yes. I 
have indicated that. It was first proposed twenty-one years ago, 
I believe. What the House does is up to the House. It has under-
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t a ken its own special intelligence investigation this past year 
and may arrive at differing conclusions on where to go from here 
in the context of its own constitutional responsibility. But, in 
my mind, it is clear from the Constitution, from the laws and the 
history of this Nation that the Senate is assigned a unique and 
special role in foreign affairs. To more effectively perform 
that role in behalf of the American people the Senate must create 
every agency and facility needed to do the job. Intelligence 
oversight is needed. To do that job, a facility must be created. 
As a body the full Senate cannot do it and to date no 
existing committees have done it. As a result, in my own exper-
ience over the years, I along with the Senate have suffered a 
significant deficiency both as to the awareness of the intelligence 
apparatus and operation and the information gathered and assessed 
therein. 
What about the charter? I think it should be sufficiently 
broad to encompass all major intelligence organizations. Directly 
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under it, therefore, should at least come the activities of CIA, 
NSA, DSA, certain endeavors of DOD and the counterintelligence 
undertakings of the FBI. While it thus should be broad enough to 
invite the most generous scrutiny of the intelligence community 
in the Senate's behalf, it need not limit or preclude the normal 
delegated jurisdictional bases of other standing committees. In 
some cases, in fact, there is a great deal to be said for a little 
competition. But no committee, no agency of the Senate has 
exercised complete vigilence over such obvious questions, for 
example, as intelligence coordination. No committee heretofore 
has analyzed on a continuing basis the ongoing activities of each 
of the intelligence components, related their · activities to each 
other or fitted them together into an integrated whole. Overlap, 
duplication, swollen and inefficient budgets and so forth may or 
may not be in the interests of this Nation. Only by vigilence and 
understanding, however, can such judgments be made. 
And what about the issue of unconstitutional operations 
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against citizens of the United States by an intelligence appartus. 
For these, there have existed few, if any, remedies in the past. 
What remedies there have been were inadequate at best. Oversight 
coupled with a mechanism that assures accountability would go far 
in my judgment to preserve notions of individual liberty that we 
cherish so deeply. 
Of particular sensitivity is the question of budget 
analysis with respect to intelligence operations. But oversight 
per se would seem to dictate that such a function be included 
within any mandate established. In the past we have been put off 
in this area with urgings that there have been no hearings, no 
investigations and so forth. The investigations have occurred, 
hearings have been held and it is time I think that we carve out 
a rational way to perform a simple authorizing function on an 
annual basis. Such a function is essential to the question of 
accountability. Perhaps a line-item approach would not be in 
order granting the nature of many of the activities involved but 
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aggregate sums certainly reveal little,if any,of our intelligence 
story that is not already known to the world. As I recall, 
atomic and nuclear expenditures are handled in similar fashion. 
Beyond an annual authorization, however, such a committee 
must be kept informed on a continuing basis of all major activities 
and plans. Overall, it must be equipped with appropriate tools 
to assure such responsiveness. But while subpoenas, compliance 
and contempt procedures and the like should be made available --
the emphasis in this area must be on cooperation with the Executive 
and that too should be spelled out in any charter along with appro-
priate measures to require that cooperation be a two-way street. 
It seems to me that a primary concern here is to assure 
that national policy formulated largely by and within the legis-
lative branch is not to be overturned, undercut or frustrated in 
its execution and implementation. The initial burden of coming 
forward by necessity would fall on the agency or agencies involved 
and in turn it would be the responsibility of the Committee as the 
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Senate's agent to keep the Senate advised in an appropriate manner 
keeping in mind the relative importance and sensitivity of what-
ever issue happens to be at stake. Standards and safeguards 
regarding disclosure may be in order but it has always been my 
conviction that Senators are equal, that there are no super 
Senators, that no member elected to serve in this institution 
exceeds any other in terms of patriotism, of leyalty or of dedi-
cation to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States. It is, 1n fact, for this reason that I 
believe that the membership on the Intelligence Committee should 
be rotated. A limitation of six or eight years of consecutive 
service on the Committee would guarantee the vigil.nt inquiry 
that a fresh mind brings to any problem. It would avoid the 
possible danger of establishing the client relationship that 
+~ 
could otherwise~so easily occur~e~Also, it would provide in time 
a significant foundation upon which the Senate as a whole might 
confidently adjudge the recommendations of its agent -- the 
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Committee. 
Otherwise, I would apply the same standards as are 
imposed upon the other standing committees in terms of composition, 
selection, membership, staffing, the election of Chairman, and 
whatnot save only that the sensitive nature of its tasks requires 
that additional precautions be taken just as they are by the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy and just as they have been this past 
year by the Select Intelligence Committee. 
One final comment, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
Committee. While these views reflect and expand upon my public 
critique of the work and recommendations of the Commission on the 
Organization of the Government -- the so-called Murphy Commission --
with respect to the establishment of an intelligence committee, 
I would caution you and this Committee concerning an aspect of 
this issue insofar as the involv ement of Congress and the Senate 
is concerned. I served on that Commission and my views on its 
performance are rather well known. What I wish to say is that 
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there is some risk in creating any committee in this area. What 
I would not want to see happen; indeed, what would be counter-
productive would be a committee cloaked only with apparent impor-
tance, manned by some elite few who gained admission outside the 
normal selection process, centralized and aloof, and in the end so 
impotent that it would itself become a creature if not an active 
conspirator within the community over which it must exert scrutiny. 
Make it independent. Give it the tools and power to protect that 
independence. And above all, make certain that it responds to 
the Senate and to the Senate alone. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. 
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